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The purpose of the article is to 
present basic argumentation of 
Brian Z. Tamanaha leading him 
to his original non-essentialist ap-
proach to legal pluralism2 which 
 1 Previous version of this article was 
presented at the scientific conference 
Bliski Wschód a Europa. Problemy 
tożsamości i różnorodności [Mid-
dle East and Europe. Problems of 
Identity and Diversity] on 16-19th 
November 2017 in Hebdów, Poland. 
I would like to take this opportunity 
to express my gratitude to the par-
ticipants and organisers (especially 
Bartosz Bodziński-Guzik) for the 
invitation and inspiring comments. 
This of course, does not alter the fact 
that only I am responsible for any 
substantive shortcomings of this 
paper. This paper is a translation of 
paper published originally in Polish: 
Komentarz do nieesencjalistycznego 
ujęcia pluralizmu prawnego Briana 
Z. Tamanahy, „Forum Prawnicze” 
2017, no. 6 (44), p. 25–38.
 2 Although Tamanaha discusses legal 
pluralism in few publications (see esp. 
The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Con-
cept of Legal Pluralism, „Journal of 
Law and Society” 1993, vol. 20, no. 2 
or Understanding Legal Pluralism. 
Past to Present, Local to Global, „Syd-
ney Law Review” 2008, vol. 30, no. 3), 
the broadest dimension of his non-es-
sentialist approach can be observed 
in A General Jurisprudence of Law 
and Society, Oxford 2001, p. 171–205 
(where he not only repeats, but also 
develops earlier A Non-Essentialist 
Version of Legal Pluralism, „Journal 
of Law and Society” 2000, vol. 27, 
no. 2). Hence, this article focuses on 
B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurispru-
dence…, op. cit. In addition to a very 
frequent reference in the literature 
to legal pluralism offered by Tama-
naha, it is also the subject of more 
complex comments, many of which, 
however, seem to focus on general 
theses on law, related obviously to 
the concept of non-essentialist le-
gal pluralism, see e.g. K. E. Himma, 
Do Philosophy and Sociology Mix? 
A Non-Essentialist Socio-Legal Posi-
tivist Analysis of the Concept of Law, 
„Oxford Journal of Legal Studies” 
2004, vol. 24, no. 4; V. Saleh-Han-
na, Women, Law, and Resistance in 
Northern Nigeria. Understanding the 
Inadequacies of Western Scholarship 
(in:) V. Saleh-Hanna (ed.), Colonial 
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refuses to make any assumptions about the charac-
teristics that law must display to be recognized as law; 
it is also an attempt to evaluate this concept and its 
justification. Legal pluralism itself, most fundamen-
tally understood as the situation of parallel function-
ing of many (minimum two) different legal orders 
in a given time and area,3 is an issue noticed in the 
field of sociology of law basically from its beginnings. 
Conceptualization of this phenomenon can eventu-
ally be noticed not only in the work of Eugen Ehrlich, 
Systems of Control. Criminal Justice in Nigeria, Ottawa 2008, 
p. 329–336; W. Twining, General Jurisprudence. Understand-
ing Law from a Global Perspective, Cambridge 2009, esp. 
p. 88–121 (a shorter version of idem, A Post-Westphalian 
Conception of Law, „Law & Society Review” 2003, vol. 37, 
no. 1); B. Dupret, Prawo w naukach społecznych [Law in 
Social Sciences], transl. J. Stryjczyk, Warszawa 2010, esp. 
p. 191–195; idem, Adjudication in Action. An Ethnometodology 
of Law, Morality and Justice, transl. P. Ghazaleh, Farnham 
2011, esp. p. 31–35; V. M. Muńiz-Fraticelli, The Structure of 
Pluralism. On the Authority of Associations, Oxford 2014, esp. 
p. 143–149; K. M. Ehrenberg, The Functions of Law, Oxford 
2016, p. 141–145; T. Gizbert-Studnicki, A. Dyrda, A. Grabow-
ski, Metodologiczne dychotomie. Krytyka pozytywistycznych 
teorii prawa [Methodological Dichotomies. A Critique of 
Positivist Theories of Law], Warszawa 2017, esp. A. Dyrda, 
p. 237–251; D. v. Daniels, A Genealogical Perspective on 
Pluralist Jurisprudence (in:) N. Roughan, A. Halpin (eds.), 
In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence, Cambridge 2017, esp. 
p. 175–181. Against this background, this paper focuses 
solely on the non-essentialist approach to legal pluralism. 
The aim below is to avoid repeating the issues perceived 
by previous commentators with Tamanaha’s reflections on 
law in general, legal pluralism itself or both of these strands 
viewed together. Instead, it aspires to highlight the previously 
largely unstressed controversies in the ‘content’ of concept 
of the non-essentialist legal pluralism and argumentation 
in its favour.
 3 J. Winczorek, Pluralizm prawny [Legal Pluralism] (in:) A. Ko-
ciołek-Pęksa, M. Stępień (eds.), Leksykon socjologii prawa 
[Lexicon of Sociology of Law], Warszawa 2013, p. 181–182; 
A. Kojder, Pluralizm prawny [Legal Pluralism] (in:) A. Koj-
der, Z. Cywiński (eds.), Socjologia prawa. Główne problemy 
i postacie [Sociology of Law. Main Problems and Figures], 
Warszawa 2014, p. 295.
but also Leon Petrażycki.4 Those, of course, are not 
the only names cited in the context of the discussion 
about legal pluralism. Leaving aside the controver-
sies whether authors themselves interpret their ideas 
as concepts of legal pluralism or possible changes to 
original approaches,5 it is also worth mentioning Sal-
ly Falk Moore, John Griffiths, Gunther Teubner and 
Roger Cotterrell.6 It should be noted, however, that 
this indication is far from an exhaustive list of schol-
ars trying to impose a certain theoretical framework 
on the phenomenon they are interested in.
In the context of the current, rich discussion about 
legal pluralism, it is Tamanaha, however, who turns out 
to be its most interesting theoretician, as he seems to 
reject all previous conceptualizations of the phenome-
non and in their place, he proposes a new, specifically 
radical approach. As he argues, its benefit is primarily 
to avoid one fundamental issue with current concepts 
of legal pluralism – overly wide conceptualization of 
law, which makes distinguishing law from non-law 
almost impossible. As will be argued below, not only 
Tamanaha’s solution to this problem seems question-
able. The non-essentialist concept of legal pluralism 
leads to many other issues. An attempt at a more accu-
rate enumeration of advantages and disadvantages of 
the discussed idea will be needed before it is generally 
assessed and decided to be applied in the analyses of 
specific realities. In the end, even a brief observation 
of the phenomena related to a political or legal prac-
tice in a broad sense, not only the most recent ones7 
 4 J. Winczorek, Pluralizm prawny wczoraj i dziś. Kilka uwag o 
ewolucji pojęcia [Legal Pluralism Yesterday and Today. A Few 
Remarks on the Evolution of the Concept] (in:) D. Buni-
kowski, K. Dobrzeniecki (eds.), Pluralizm prawny. Tradycja, 
transformacje, wyzwania [Legal Pluralism. Tradition, Trans-
formations, Challenges], Toruń 2009, p. 18–19.
 5 Cf. for example approach of Moore herself and Griffiths’ 
change of view described in: B. Z. Tamanaha, Understanding 
Legal Pluralism…, op. cit., p. 392–396.
 6 J. Winczorek, Pluralizm prawny wczoraj i dziś…, op. cit., 
p. 23–24, 25–31.
 7 The phenomenon of regionalization of interpretation, not 
limited to the period of any of the previous terms of office 
of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, see e.g. T. Stawecki, 
Prawo w książkach i prawo na dyskach – konsekwencje dla 
praktyki wykładni prawa [Law in Books and Law on Disks – 
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and not only noted in the domestic reality,8 but also 
outside Poland9 can justify the assumption that legal 
pluralism is a fact and as such, requires appropriate 
theoretical tools. It is then worth taking the trouble 
of answering the following question: in the face of 
suggested phenomena and tendencies, what is the 
sense and degree to which Tamanaha’s concept can 
be useful? However, before an answer is provided and 
a number of other comments to it are presented, one 
should introduce it, at least briefly. 
Tamanaha begins his reflections on legal pluralism 
as well as the pursuit of his own concept by pointing 
out the most important in his view errors in previous 
conceptualizations.10 Above all, he believes that it is 
wrong to start analyzing the phenomenon of legal 
pluralism from adopting a specific and more or less 
extensive definition of law; though not only among 
theoreticians of legal pluralism but also in general (re-
gardless of whether it is ‘ordinary’ people or learned 
lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists or philosophers) 
there has never been and most probably will not be 
a consensus as to any definition. However, not only 
Consequences for the Practice of Interpreting the Law] (in:) 
S. Lewandowski, H. Machińska, J. Petzel (eds.), Prawo, język, 
logika. Księga jubileuszowa profesora Andrzeja Malinow-
skiego [Law, Language, Logic. The Jubilee Book of Andrzej 
Malinowski], Warszawa 2013, p. 243.
 8 A series of disputes that are part of the wider constitutional 
crisis in Poland, see e.g. P. Radziewicz, P. Tuleja (eds.), Kon-
stytucyjny spór o granice zmian organizacji i zasad działania 
Trybunału Konstytucyjnego: czerwiec 2015 – marzec 2016 
[Constitutional Dispute about the Limits of Changes in the 
Organization and Rules of Operation of the Constitutional 
Tribunal: June 2015 – March 2016], Warszawa 2017. Never-
theless, it should also be noted that pluralisation/departure 
from monism of the Polish legal order, also in reference to 
the activities and impact of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
was noticed much earlier, see T. Stawecki, W. Staśkiewicz, 
J. Winczorek, Między policentrycznością a fragmentaryzacją. 
Wpływ Trybunału Konstytucyjnego na polski porządek prawny 
[Between Polycentrism and Fragmentation. The Impact of 
Constitutional Tribunal Rulings on the Polish Legal Order], 
Warszawa 2008, p. 76.
 9 For example the dispute on the independence referendum 
in Catalonia on 1st October 2017.
10 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, op. cit., p. 172–175.
insisting on defining the law is wrong despite each 
definition being seemingly more or less questioned, 
but Tamanaha also argues that the definitions offered 
by the existing theoreticians of legal pluralism usu-
ally make it impossible to distinguish law from what 
either is not law or is difficult to be recognized as law. 
As an example, he provides the mentioned classic 
Ehrlich who is criticized not only by Tamanaha for 
his approach to law being simply too general to be 
used as a basis for detailed (and so assuming subtle 
distinctions) analyses.11 Without considering here 
the extent to which Tamanaha’s general conclusions 
are in fact adequate to all other approaches to legal 
pluralism,12 it should be noted that the commented 
author is actually keen in using similar and very broad 
generalizations.
The analysis of definitions constructed by the said 
theoreticians of legal pluralism or used by them for 
their own purposes leads Tamanaha to distinguish-
ing de facto only two basic ways of defining the law.13 
Firstly, referring mainly to works from the field of 
anthropology or anthropology of law, or part of so-
ciology of law, he indicates the recognition of law as 
stable patterns of specific activities in given groups 
or entire communities. Of course, it is right on the 
ground of such conceptualizations where it becomes 
very difficult, if not even impossible, to distinguish 
law from what is not law or what would rather not be 
defined as one. In the end, if only certain patterns 
of behaviour developed in social practice among a 
specific population are to be considered as law, then 
the rules of mutual neighbourly help on collection 
of agricultural crops, backyard football matches or 
proper dressing according to an occasion, or rules of 
politeness can also be considered so. In fact, it is dif-
11 Ibidem, p. 176; See also A. Kojder, Z Czerniowców w szeroki 
świat… Eugen Ehrlich i narodziny idei socjologii prawa [From 
Czernowitz to the Wide World… Eugen Ehrlich and the Birth 
of Idea of Sociology of Law] (in:) A. Flis (ed.), Stawanie się 
społeczeństwa. Szkice ofiarowane Piotrowi Sztompce z okazji 
40-lecia pracy naukowej [Becoming of a Society. Sketches Of-
fered to Piotr Sztompka on the Occasion of 40th Anniversary 
of Scientific Work], Kraków 2006, p. 143–144.
12 For example whether similar delimitation issues are noticed 
with the mentioned Petrażycki.
13 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, op. cit., p. 175–181.
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ficult to point out something that is not the law. As a 
consequence, demonstrating the multiplicity of ‘laws’ 
may turn out to be a relatively easy task, although 
another perspective is allowed, according to which 
if generally recognized patterns of a social behaviour 
are considered the law, then pluralism understood as a 
coexistence of minimum two different orders will not 
occur. After all, almost everything will fit or be able 
to be contained in one law. Therefore, the existence 
of two legal orders next to each other, not to mention 
a larger number, can be considered very unlikely.
The second method of defining law indicated by 
Tamanaha is, in turn, associated above all with the 
tradition of analytical theory and philosophy of law 
under the sign of Herbert L. A. Hart. It boils down to 
perceiving law as an institutionalized application or 
enforcement of norms that arose within the activity 
of specific institutions. This method of recognizing 
law is also criticized for inadequacy. Concededly, one 
can suppose that the definitions using the category of 
institutionalization in fact support the modern state 
and laws created within its structures, but it must 
be remembered that such institutionalized creation, 
application, and even enforcement of rules are also 
present outside the state’s structures. It is sufficient 
to give an example of the activity of contemporary 
sports federations or scientific associations and try to 
answer the question whether the rules created within 
such structures are the law, in order to fully realize it. 
Thus, despite the significant narrowing approach to 
this method of grasping the law in comparison to the 
first one distinguished by Tamanaha, it still seems to 
be overly wide. Again, giving up an attempt to assess 
the extent in which Tamanaha’s only two reconstruct-
ed ways of defining the law are adequate to the wealth 
of previous attempts to grasp its alleged essence, one 
may agree with the following statement of his. With-
in both these basic ways of defining law, one formula 
is finally sought that would be adequate to the entire 
field. According to Tamanaha, the use of some more 
specific form of the first or second way of defining 
law by theoreticians of legal pluralism is not the last 
fundamental mistake that they make.
Namely, Tamanaha also opposes broadly understood 
functionalism in definitions of law.14 He specifically 
means formulas containing an indication of the most 
crucial purposes that law is supposed to implement in 
order to be referred to as the law. He recognizes for-
mulas similar to the following one – ‘the law provides 
social order’ – as wrong not only because only some 
elements of law are effective in achieving the assumed 
function, but also because this depends on circum-
stances, as general functional effectiveness of the law 
may undergo significant changes, and in the face of 
its decrease one must eventually take into account 
the question whether the law losing its effectiveness 
is still the law. The functionalist conceptualization of 
law is also wrong because a given function supposed 
to be brought about by the law, which can include not 
only the mentioned social order, but also the social 
exchange, socialization or basically anything that any 
given theoretician would be ready to accentuate, can 
14 Ibidem, p. 176, 179, 180.
If generally recognized patterns of a social behaviour 
are considered the law, then pluralism understood 
as a coexistence of minimum two different orders 
will not occur. After all, almost everything will 
fit or be able to be contained in one law.
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actually be successfully implemented by something 
other than the phenomenon defined by this function. 
In the end – is it in fact only the law that is responsible 
for the social order? If not, and so when the social or-
der could also be explained by referring to something 
else than the law, e.g. morality, customary and even 
religious norms, then defining and identifying law on 
the basis of the function of providing the social order 
turns out to be simply inadequate. Since the function 
favoured in a given functionalist definition of law is 
actually performed by many other phenomena or ob-
jects in social life, it is incapable of grasping law and 
nothing more but law. Tamanaha, again, at a very large 
and not undisputable level of generality, points out an 
erroneous way of conceptualizing law, which can also 
be used while discussing legal pluralism.
However, as already presented, Tamanaha does not 
criticize current legal pluralism for the sake of sheer 
criticism, but on the basis of his observations and anal-
yses, he wants to propose the new theoretical frame-
work. In the face of the indicated issues, he suggests 
to abandon the essentialist conceptualization of law, 
that is, defining law by any characteristics necessary 
for it to be defined as such. Instead, while dealing with 
the phenomenon of legal pluralism, one should make 
a starting assertion that the law is what is recognized 
as the law by people.15 Such a specific escape from the 
effort of formulating a more substantial concept of law 
Tamanaha justifies by the conclusion from analyses 
carried out by him and briefly presented above which, 
in turn, lead him to a judgment that what the law is 
and what it does cannot be put into one universal 
formula. The law seems to always escape essentialist 
conceptualizations to a greater or lesser extent and for 
this reason, it should be grasped in the most formal 
way without implying its necessary characteristics. 
Tamanaha concludes that the best way to address 
such non-essentialism in the conceptualization of law 
is to say that the law de facto is what people ‘label’ as 
15 Ibidem, p. 193. Tamanaha sustains this formula in the later 
text on legal pluralism, see idem, Understanding Legal Plu-
ralism…, op cit., p. 396, and also as part of his latest mono-
graphic work, which deals in law in general, but no longer 
takes into consideration the pluralism itself so explicitly, see 
idem, A Realistic Theory of Law, Cambridge 2017, e.g. p. 194.
the law; what they call as that. He also adds that, in 
principle, his proposal is not a classic definition, but 
a way to delimit law from what is not law; something 
with which, as has been mentioned, the vast majority 
of theoreticians have a big problem, regardless of which 
of the three methods of conceptualizing law (refer-
ring to patterns of behaviour, institutionalization or 
function) indicated above they opt for. Additionally, 
in accordance with Tamanaha’s reconstruction, when 
the foregoing theoreticians of legal pluralism begin 
their deliberations from certain substantial, essentialist 
definitions of law, it leads to the very phenomenon of 
legal pluralism being grasped as a co-occurrence of 
various manifestations of law (in a specific time and 
area), which is understood on the basis of one, particu-
lar formula assumed by a given scholar.16 Tamanaha’s 
position precludes a similar research practice, for at 
the beginning of his analysis he rejects the assump-
tion of the existence of any specific characteristics or 
properties that the law is supposed to have, also in 
its many parallel manifestations. According to his 
views, legal pluralism will occur when various phe-
nomena are eventually ‘labeled’ as the law by people 
and between these social identifications there are 
smaller or larger differences.17 In other words, when 
at a given time and place, among a given population 
there are different opinions as to what the law is, that 
is when, for instance, one part of a society sees it in 
given objects and phenomena, whereas the other does 
not necessarily share that opinion and identifies with 
it different things, then according to the statement – 
‘law is what people define as such’, one can talk about 
legal pluralism. Not in a sense of coexisting various 
manifestations of what meets the requirements of a 
specific concept of law, adopted by any given theo-
retician (reminiscent of the approaches criticized by 
Tamanaha), but in terms of the multiplicity of differ-
ent social identifications of law. 
As it may be easy to guess at this stage, while devel-
oping his non-essentialist approach to legal pluralism 
Tamanaha proposes to perform analyses on two dif-
ferent levels in a specific order18 during its application. 
16 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, op. cit., p. 194.
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibidem, p. 195–197.
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Since the main emphasis is put on what people treat 
as the law, one should first determine what exactly 
and by whom is identified as such. The first step in 
a practical implementation of the non-essentialist 
approach to legal pluralism is to try to provide an 
empirically based answer to the question of what is 
‘labeled‘ as law in a given time interval and area in-
habited by a specific population. Upon collection of 
such ’folk’ testimonies and views on what the law is, 
one should go on another level of analysis, which con-
sists in attempting to identify on the basis of collected 
empirical data (social opinions) the general features 
or properties of what has been ‘labeled’ as the law. 
To simplify, one can say that Tamanaha proposes to 
first ask people about what they treat as the law (by 
applying appropriate empirical research methods), 
and then with reference to the gathered data, one 
should carry out generalizing analysis, the result of 
which would be the characteristic of what particular 
groups specify as the law.
Although Tamanaha just discerns these two levels of 
analysis, one may wonder whether it would be neces-
sary to add another level which could be regarded as a 
control one. Namely, it cannot be ruled out in abstracto 
that identifications of law in a given population are 
so numerous, mutually inconsistent and ultimately 
address many different objects and phenomena, that 
generalizations carried out on the second level may not 
be sufficiently subtle to preserve adequacy of certain 
social testimonies collected as part of the first stage. 
Since Tamanaha clearly supports the formulation of 
empirically established assertions, it is worth submit-
ting a postulate to supplement his research scheme with 
a third stage – the presentation of compiled general-
izations from the second stage to seek opinion of the 
representatives of a given population, whose identifi-
cations of law were collected during the first stage. If 
they accept that the conducted generalization conveys 
their view on the law, the fundamental research effort 
can be considered successful. If, however, the people 
whose testimonies were collected in the first stage did 
not find their full view reflected in the generalizations 
from the second stage, then such negative result of the 
third, control stage would prompt appropriate adjust-
ments in the analyses conducted with the empirical 
material. Although such a direction for the develop-
ment of Tamanaha’s findings is possible, it is difficult 
to speculate at this point whether he would accept it.
It is certain, however, that many other remarks can 
be made in regards to Tamanaha’s non-essentialist 
legal pluralism. Following Tamanaha’s analysis, who 
upon presenting the bases of his approach focuses on 
indicating what he considers to be advantages and 
disadvantages of this concept, one can observe that 
it is worth dealing first with the advantages, both the 
undisputed and the doubtful ones, as well as those no-
ticed and unnoticed by the commented author himself. 
As an undisputed advantage of his own view, based 
on the non-essentialist legal pluralism, Tamanaha 
recognizes the fact that one can successfully distin-
guish law from non-law.19 Although at first glance 
this positive assessment should not raise any doubts, 
it must be said directly that it is legitimate, and so the 
non-essentialist approach to legal pluralism does not 
fall into delimitation issues of previous concepts on 
one crucial condition. Subjective beliefs of several 
people about an object or phenomenon should simply 
be equated with the very subject (a reference point) 
of those beliefs. Tamanaha’s position turns out to be 
entangled in a very subtle yet significant ontological 
problem as he seems to identify the subject of individ-
ual views – the law – with those views, i.e. opinions 
about what the law is or what can be considered the 
law. The acceptance of such position or its lack depends, 
of course, on the views on social constructivism in a 
general sense, to which he refers.20 The supporters of 
constructivism may simply accept the radical position 
of Tamanaha as to defining or distinguishing law from 
non-law, along with suggested consequence of iden-
tifying the subject of beliefs with the very beliefs. On 
the other hand, those assuming, to a lesser or greater 
degree, the objectivity of certain social life phenomena 
and thus not necessarily seeing equality between the 
law and people’s views on what it is, may be sceptical 
about Tamanaha’s concept. For them, the collected 
statements about what the law is from the perspective 
of several people are not at all the basis for identifying 
it and distinguishing it from what it is not. The most 
crucial asset of Tamanaha’s concept perceived by him – 
19 Ibidem, p. 197.
20 Ibidem, p. 142, 162.
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Tamanaha’s position turns out to be entangled 
in a very subtle yet significant ontological problem 
as he seems to identify the subject of individual 
views – the law – with those views, i.e. opinions about 
what the law is or what can be considered the law.
the ability to distinguish law from non-law – ceases 
then to be an objective and undeniable advantage. 
Whether one actually grants the commented author 
the achievement which he seems to claim credit for 
depends on the preferences of people evaluating his 
concept and the extent to which they accept or reject 
basic ideas of social constructivism. To that effect, the 
cited advantage of Tamanaha’s position turns out to 
be strongly relative.
A similar character seems to have the second ad-
vantage that Tamanaha claims to himself, which ul-
timately is closely related to the first one. Namely, he 
argues that his concept enables much richer concep-
tual instruments where the categories of different 
types of social norms (normative pluralism) as well 
as internal pluralisms of the distinguished categories 
of those norms and legal pluralism itself are clearly 
distinguishable from one another.21 With reference 
to an earlier remark, one can ask whether the basic 
types of social norms themselves and their possible 
internal pluralisms will be distinguishable, or whether 
it will actually be possible to distinguish or separate 
only social assertions, identifications of moral, legal, 
religious or customary norms based on which one 
will be able to determine the degree of pluralization of 
views on a certain topic in a given population. Again, 
accepting the remark on this advantage of the non-es-
sentialist legal pluralism seems to ultimately depend 
on whether one shares the controversial views on the 
mentioned social constructivism.
21 Ibidem, p. 198.
The advantage of Tamanaha’s concept which, in turn, 
seems non-relative and independent of the adopted as-
sumptions or assessing criteria, is that a lot of research 
issues are generated on its basis. Although Tamanaha 
himself focuses on the following research question 
which in virtue of his arguments is immediately ob-
vious – ‘who, why and what one identifies as law’,22 
there are definitely other interesting issues worth 
considering. Not only it is worth thinking through 
correlation between responses to the indicated ques-
tion with different socio-demographic variables of 
respondents, but also determining, in the light of the 
collected testimonies, any specific borderline condi-
tions to identify certain phenomena as legal ones in 
a given society or within specific, identifiable social 
groups. The latter can, however, be arranged within the 
mentioned framework of the second level of legal plu-
ralism analyses distinguished by Tamanaha, whereas 
the obtained results may possibly be subject to control 
as part of the suggested third stage or its appropriate 
modification. Although a very modest analysis of 
Tamanaha’s concept in terms of its empirical appli-
cation or prospect for socio-legal research suggests 
its great potential, the author himself does not seem 
to notice it. Instead of developing the strand of this 
significant advantage, he goes on to point out another 
positive side of his concept, which, however, may raise 
serious doubts just like the previously commented 
elements of Tamanaha’s affirmative self-evaluation.
22 Ibidem, p. 199.
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Namely, he argues that the discussed assertion 
that the law is what people signify as such is positive 
in regards to not only avoiding any presuppositions 
about law, but also assumed hierarchies of validity 
and significance of its different types.23 However, in 
view of such a statement, the question may arise as to 
whether the lack of hierarchy of different types of law 
is desired. This thread, however, will be discussed later 
in reflections on the flaws of the concept in question.
Tamanaha himself indicates some issues related to 
his concept, but as it is shown below, one can wonder 
whether he pays attention to all and most important 
ones. If the law is to be what people recognize as such, 
then he notices the need to supplement his concept 
with an answer to the following question: ‘who exact-
ly and how many people must recognize something 
as the law in order for it to «count»’?24 In fact, com-
plementing his concept with a solution to this issue 
seems necessary. It should be noted, however, from 
a more critical perspective that the introduction of 
certain quantitative or qualitative measures, which 
must be met by the social identifications of law and 
people expressing them, can always raise doubts that 
ultimately a very particular approach to law is sup-
ported instead of a neutral description of certain phe-
nomena and trends. As it will be further developed 
below, Tamanaha’s concept seems completely devoid 
of even the simplest elements of a more suspicious, 
critical view of law as well as theoretical construc-
tions concerning it.
Continuing the matter of issues with his own con-
cept, Tamanaha rightly formulates the next question: 
‘what uses of the concept of law should be treated as 
relevant in determining what people treat as the law, 
and thereby investigating what it is (on the basis of a 
given population or its part)?’.25 In fact, Tamanaha puts 
emphasis on determining what people are sticking the 
‘label’ of law to, whereas he treats laconically the issue 
of what people seem to be or may be associating with 
the very word ‘law’, and this can actually connote a 
lot. Namely, the fact that a person defines something 
as the law – in other words, ‘puts the label’ of law – 
23 Ibidem, p. 199–200.
24 Ibidem, p. 200, and also p. 166–167.
25 Ibidem, p. 200, and also p. 168–169.
does not mean that he or she thinks of the law as e.g. 
the product of the legislative bodies. The key term in 
this context after all is also used to designate certain 
empirical regularities. This, however, is not the most 
important problem. Even if someone uses the term 
‘law’ in a way that Tamanaha himself seems to have 
in mind, that is, as an identification of a certain type 
of normativity that appears (or may exist) in human 
societies, it is also worth bearing in mind such pos-
sible uses of this term, which may not be expressed 
seriously and with confidence, but ironically or with-
out certainty. Although this is truly a very significant 
issue about the commented concept, its author himself 
while recognizing this controversy, devotes surpris-
ingly little room for any, even a preliminary attempt 
to solve it at least partially. This seems necessary if one 
wants to use Tamanaha’s concept in accordance with 
one of its purposes – to conduct empirical research. 
Without addressing the issue raised here, adequate 
interpretation of the collected empirical data, that is, 
the views of the society or its part on what the law is, 
will be very difficult if not impossible.26
Meanwhile, Tamanaha rapidly goes on to indicate 
another problem which in his opinion are linguistic (as 
well as cultural) differences related to the word ‘law’.27 
He claims that, although in many ethnic languages 
one can find words that are equivalent to the Polish 
wording ’prawo’ (‘law’), they can ultimately mean 
something different or be used in subtly distinct con-
texts. For instance, is it possible to juxtapose the Poles’ 
statements about what ‘law’ is to them with those by the 
Germans indicating what ‘Recht’ is to them? In other 
words, Tamanaha fears to encounter great difficulties 
while comparing the empirical researches carried out 
in different countries. In light of the previously raised 
fundamental problem of using the concept of law even 
26 Added to this can be the concern for individual prejudices 
of interpreters/researchers and their impact on analyzing 
empirical data, see B. Truffin, O. Struelens, Through the 
Looking Glass of Diversity. The Right to Family Life from 
the Perspectives of Transnational Families in Belgium (in:) 
G. Corradi, E. Brems, M. Goodale (eds.), Human Rights En-
counter Legal Pluralism. Normative and Empirical Approaches, 
Oxford–Portland–Oregon 2017, p. 207–208.
27 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, op. cit., p. 200, 
and also p. 169.
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on the basis of just one ethnic language, which would 
be taken into account in empirical research, it is sur-
prising that Tamanaha, without solving it, considers 
using his own concept also on an international scale. 
Without even putting a solution forward to problems 
related to the possible use of his concept on the scale 
of one country, he claims that it can be used for com-
parative studies. Most likely, this is where the issue of 
identifying the relevant use of the concept of law will 
pile up with the problems of translation. 
Clearly focusing on the word ‘law’ and its equiva-
lents in other ethnic languages leads Tamanaha to see 
another problem, in his own opinion – the inadequacy 
of his concept towards indigenous, aboriginal or tribal 
communities that may not contain the word ‘law’ in 
their languages.28 In other words, he admits that his 
concept is not of a universal range, and it cannot be 
applied to all human communities. Although this is 
a legitimate observation, one may wonder whether 
the non-universality of a similar concept should be 
assessed in terms of its flaws or imperfections.
Although the commented author seems to notice 
some significant issues of his own construction, one 
can get the impression that he does not pay too much 
attention to even partially referring to them in a more 
critical way. In addition, there are other controversies 
that may be pointed out in regards to his non-essen-
28 Ibidem, p. 203–205.
tialist legal pluralism, which are not raised by the 
author at all. 
First of all, the following questions arise when con-
fronted with this concept. Does the law really only 
is to be constituted by the fact that a certain group 
of people seems to mark something as law? Is the 
law just a ‘label’ put by people to various objects and 
phenomena? Would the people chosen by Tamana-
ha to undergo an assessment in accordance with his 
assumptions agree with his concept? In his position, 
a specific tension can be identified. On the one hand, 
he rightly wants to explore and get to know what peo-
ple perceive as law. On the other, however, he comes 
from rather unpopular and counterintuitive thesis 
that law is empty, without any slightest essence, and 
only the subjective views ultimately decide on what it 
is. He, therefore, seems to favour the ‘folk’, democratic 
view on the law but, as a consequence, proposes in its 
own way a radical, theoretical construction with, in 
all likelihood, negligible social support. Certainly, a 
closer look at the discussed concept will probably lead 
to a conclusion that Tamanaha, by claiming that law is 
what people identify as law, really operates at the level 
of certain meta-views and does not set his notion in 
the same row with specific views on the subject matter, 
which certainly in the majority of cases are essential-
istic (more or less). One can, however, doubt whether 
Tamanaha clearly enough emphasizes the status of 
his own assertions, suggested here. 
Does the law really only is to be constituted 
by the fact that a certain group of people seems 
to mark something as law? Is the law just a ‘label’ 
put by people to various objects and phenomena? 
Would the people chosen by Tamanaha 
to undergo an assessment in accordance 
with his assumptions agree with his concept?
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Such emphasis of the level on which Tamanaha 
seems to operate is necessary especially if one imagi-
nes a growing popularity of his thesis which claims 
that the law has no essence and is only what people 
consider it to be. For if the members of a particular 
society will begin to increasingly believe in this thesis, 
some negative social consequences can be expected to 
follow. When people are convinced that in fact their 
subjective judgments determine what the law is and 
what it is not, and their views are not compatible with 
one another, one can expect an increase in the antag-
onisms between the representatives of different views 
or not necessarily socially functional nonconformism 
(violating something that some perceive as the law 
by those who disagree with this opinion). In light of 
this statement, Tamanaha surely wants to include as 
many social views as possible and represents a kind of 
democratic descriptivism. One may wonder, however, 
if he is not going too far, or, as a consequence, is not 
seemingly trying to opt out from taking into account 
and suggesting solutions to predictable or actually ex-
isting deep political and social disputes over the law. 
The disputes concerning the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal or the referendum in Catalonia of 1st October 
2017, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, can 
obviously be easily included in Tamanaha’s general 
idea, according to which people may disagree in their 
identifications of law. Colloquially speaking, some may 
simply think one thing, while others another. Between 
such groups, there may be clear and sometimes even 
fierce conflicts in which each party will uphold their 
original thesis, and thus insist on their identification 
of law. It must, however, be openly said that a more 
general theoretical concept is not needed to draw sim-
ilar conclusions. In light of a general life observation 
that people tend to disagree over specific issues, and 
so in the face of pluralization of views on particular 
matters, the non-essentialist legal pluralism seems 
to become a rather trivial concept. It remains only a 
very general frame for describing certain phenomena.
Tamanaha, however, does not in any way propose 
or even seem interested in answering the question of 
how to proceed in the light of certain cases of legal 
pluralism. It is right here that Tamanaha’s far-reach-
ing lack of commitment and his emphasis on descrip-
tiveness are manifested with complete omission of a 
critical discussion about how to assess manifestations 
of legal pluralism and react to negative cases. In other 
words, he does not bother to take into account the so-
cial reality when argues that the definitions of law or 
hierarchies of the types of law are inadequate. From 
the perspective of a theoretician, it may be that even 
the majority of them are actually wrong. One should, 
however, keep in mind that definitions or hierarchies 
can also perform social functions by structuring inter-
actions in a given population, contributing to greater 
predictability of life and being one of the pillars of the 
social order. Should a situation really be deemed inap-
propriate when a given definition of law or hierarchy 
of the types of law become more popular in a society 
or even simply accepted by its members as a result of 
adequate, thorough and non-coercive argumenta-
tion in their favour? Are definitions and hierarchies 
unconditionally wrong from this social perspective? 
Tamanaha seems to completely ignore these questions 
or not notice them. It is in a way paradoxical to be 
dealing with legal pluralism as a social phenomenon, 
arising from the fact that people differently identify 
the law, while omitting the importance of its broadly 
recognized definitions for the functioning of a soci-
ety. There should be no illusions though that various 
manifestations of legal pluralism may cause more 
social problems than constitute their solutions. The 
latter, however, are not even suggested by Tamanaha 
in any way. It thus seems that his approach of a social-
ly non-involved scholar prevails over the will to take 
into account the current realities and their problems 
or needs.29 In this sense, Tamanaha is quite a con-
servative sociologist of law. He describes but does 
not even consider different alternatives in relation to 
something that cannot always be positively evaluated.
It is also worth emphasizing that for Tamanaha 
himself his concept seems quite difficult for consist-
ent adherence. On the level of assumptions, he wants 
to study people’s identification of different objects 
and phenomena as law, putting thereby significant 
29 This can, in turn, be associated with his previous remarks 
on the political involvement of part of the Anglo-American 
sociology of law, which are not lacking truth; see. B. Z. Tama-
naha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory. Pragmatism and a Social 
Theory of Law, Oxford 1997, p. 20–24.
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emphasis on subjectivity. However, in many points 
of his deliberations, Tamanaha mentions the study 
of the relationship between different types of law and 
even performs simplified analyses, such as the rela-
tion between the state law and religious law.30 It can, 
therefore, be said that in these passages, he discusses 
not just the subjective beliefs, but what these beliefs 
can relate to. Tamanaha can obviously be accounted 
for not giving up in these passages his fundamental 
constructivist assumption that it is the law what people 
identify as such. It can be claimed, however, that he is 
considering relations between the already identified 
and generalized characteristics of specific types of law, 
established on the basis of empirical research. What 
remains problematic, however, is that Tamanaha has 
not conducted such research nor even has referred to 
studies that could serve him as a basis for such gen-
eralization and a discussion about the relationships 
between different kinds of laws. This detail, however, 
is not the only one in Tamanaha’s argumentation that 
may raise doubts. 
Although this is undoubtedly a very strong word-
ing, one can find in his deliberations some contradic-
tion almost bordering with hypocrisy. At the core of 
non-essentialist legal pluralism, Tamanaha declares 
some kind of openness to various views in line with 
the statement that law is what people recognize as 
such, but on the other hand, he carries quite strong 
criticism leading eventually to rejecting other ways of 
identifying law, which, like even Hart’s concept, have 
gained great recognition and it cannot be ruled out 
that they form a part of informal intuitions about law. 
It is difficult to criticize, without contradicting oneself, 
the common definitions of law and legal pluralism 
conceptualizations built on their basis, by assuming 
that the law is ultimately what people deem it to be. 
Tamanaha’s discussion with the concept of already 
mentioned Teubner is an exemplification of this state 
of affairs.31 It is also worth quoting for it allows disclos-
ing perhaps a further issue with Tamanaha’s concept, 
which can be reduced to the following accusation of 
incomplete pursuance of own assumptions and thus 
30 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, op. cit., p. 199; 
idem, Understanding Legal Pluralism…, op. cit., p. 396–409.
31 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, p. 186–191.
falling in contradiction which can even be described 
as fundamental or basic.
Teubner, as one of the recognized representatives 
of systemic or autopoietic theories of law, by refer-
ring to the work of Niklas Luhmann, assumes that 
the law is ultimately a set of messages (communica-
tions) made on the basis of a binary code of the legal/
illegal. To simplify, certain phenomena which relate 
to messages based on the codes such as profit/loss or 
power/lack of power, and so constituting respectively 
economic or political phenomena remain legally ir-
relevant until they are observed from the perspective 
of the legal binary code, regardless of whether they 
are referred to as legal or illegal. On the other hand, 
when a legal communication is formulated, even re-
garding a phenomenon very rarely associated with 
official law or objectively not constituting the subject 
of formally binding regulations, it becomes a part of 
the system-theoretically understood law. Beginning 
with such general assumptions, for Teubner legal plu-
ralism means ‘multiplicity of diverse communicative 
processes that observe social action under the bina-
ry code of legal/illegal’,32 and – by adding – different 
observations of the same broadly understood subject 
do not have to coincide in coding. The same can be 
recognized by specific messages as legal and, at the 
same time, illegal by others.
Apart from the question on how reliable and ade-
quate Tamanaha is in conveying the concept of Teub-
ner,33 it must be said that his most important objection, 
in the discussed context, is imputing huge complexity 
in the identification of law based on a binary code due 
to the fluidity and dynamics of communication as well 
as the fact that the legal/illegal distinction is invoked 
not only clearly and explicitly, but also implicitly. In 
other words, Tamanaha criticizes the focus on lan-
guage or privileging of communication processes in 
the conceptualization of law and legal pluralism in 
Teubner. Although similar doubts may be raised, it is 
32 G. Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus. Rethinking Legal Plu-
ralism (in:) K. Tuori, Z. Bankowski, J. Uusitalo (eds.), Law 
and Power. Critical and Socio-Legal Essays, Liverpool 1997, 
p. 128.
33 Cf. R. Nobles, D. Schiff, Observing Law through Systems 
Theory, Oxford–Portland–Oregon 2013, p. 91–99.
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quite puzzling and even paradoxical that such criticism 
is formulated by Tamanaha. After all, he ultimately 
favours language or rather just one word – ‘law’ – and 
its possible counterparts in other ethnic languages. He 
claims that ‘(…) if no group within a society refers to 
«law», then there is no law in that society’.34 The law 
exists when a given group of people defines something 
as the law, using a proper word in the right meaning. 
Not only it is possible, therefore, to see the specific 
hypocrisy of Tamanaha in his assessment of Teubner, 
but also start wondering whether Tamanaha ultimately 
does not contradict himself and yet fails to carry out 
all the deliberations in line with the original assump-
tions. In the end, does Tamanaha actually avoid any 
assumptions about the even minimum essence of law 
if he pays so much attention to whether there are peo-
ple in a specific community who describe something 
through the specifically understood word ‘law’ and 
its counterparts in other languages?
As can be noted from the above comment, Tama-
naha’s concept is controversial and problematic on 
many levels. Certain doubts may also arise from the 
argumentation that leads to it and justifies it. Its author 
can be accused, among other things, of the following: 
very broad and exceptionally bold generalizations used 
as a starting point; bringing charges against others 
while seemingly duplicating some of the criticized 
schemes; not developing important strands regarding 
34 B. Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence…, op. cit., p. 201.
linguistic marking of specific objects and phenomena 
as law and possible research perspectives; almost ex-
cessive descriptivism and specific non-criticality and 
lack of traces of engagement in the face of actual and 
predictable manifestations of socially negative (de-
structive) legal pluralism; not recognizing important 
social functions of definitions and hierarchies of law; 
raising doubts confidence in the non-essentialism of 
his own concept and the possibility of delimiting on 
its grounds the law from non-law. Of course, against 
other conceptualizations of legal pluralism, the idea 
of Tamanaha seems to allow a much clearer distinc-
tion between the law and non-law, with acceptance 
of a constructivist perspective. In this regard only, 
reaching for this concept can be explained. However, 
one has to be conscious of it in a more complete way 
as a tool for potential use in one’s own ventures. The 
above considerations are conceived as a more detailed, 
critical analysis of non-essentialist legal pluralism, 
which suggests to those interested, either theoreti-
cally or empirically, sometimes subtle yet significant 
problems whose solving, even partially, may require 
modification of the original Tamanaha’s proposal, 
reaching for another theoretical basis or creating own 
concept of legal pluralism. The latter method may be 
desirable particularly when aspiring to analyze certain 
realities (e.g. a particular state in a given time inter-
val). Tamanaha, in turn, undoubtedly has universal 
ambitions about his own concept. This general idea 
is to be applicable to numerous different situations. 
Does Tamanaha actually avoid any assumptions 
about the even minimum essence of law if he pays 
so much attention to whether there are people 
in a specific community who describe something 
through the specifically understood word ‘law’ 
and its counterparts in other languages?
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Perhaps, however, this is another mistake not only 
made by Tamanaha, and the concepts of legal plural-
ism should not look for such a broad, global appeal. 
Instead, perhaps the most appropriate approach is to 
build many concepts of legal pluralism focused on 
very specific realities, such as those in contemporary 
Poland, Spain, Ireland, Canada, Japan, Indonesia, In-
dia, Turkey, Lebanon etc. In order to assess whether 
such a scenario will actually produce better results 
than the non-essentialist legal pluralism, an attempt 
must be made to implement it.
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